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Highlights 
• Examine the association between director compensation and director activity 
• Firms use meeting fees and equity-based compensation as substitutes. 
• Meetings fees are associated with more active boards and committees. 
• Equity-based compensation increases monitoring activity but not advising activity. 
• More active boards and committees are paid more. 
Abstract 
Within the nexus of contracts that makes up the firm, relatively little is known about the relationship between firms and their directors. Using a unique 
dataset comprising director compensation and activity, I find that firms use meeting fees and equity-based compensation as substitutes. In addition, 
paying directors for attending board/committee meetings is associated with more active boards and more active monitoring and advising committees. In 
contrast, a higher proportion of equity-based compensation is positively associated with monitoring activity but negatively associated with advising 
activity. Furthermore, more active boards and committees are paid more. Finally, I find that the variation in director compensation and activity generally 
reflects trade-offs between the costs and benefits of director effort, consistent with prior work. 
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1. Introduction 
When focusing on the firm as a nexus of contracts, prior work has emphasized contracting with chief executive officers (CEOs). Far less is known about 
the contractual relationships between firms and their directors. Given that directors are responsible for safeguarding shareholders' interests, a firm's 
contracts with its board members also form a central component of the nexus of contracts that makes up the firm. Thus, understanding the firm's 
contractual relationship with its directors allows for a better understanding of the firm itself. 
While a large empirical literature examines various board characteristics and the effectiveness of different corporate governance mechanisms, relatively 
few studies focus in-depth on board compensation and activity.1 Moreover, prior work has typically looked at either director compensation or director 
activity, but not at both.2 This is somewhat surprising because board compensation, board activity, and the link between the two are attracting increased 
attention from parties external to firms. For example, following MF Global Holdings' collapse in 2011, the board was criticized for being “less than 
responsive” because it met only seven times that year, compared with 11 and 22 times in the previous two years (Seol, 2012). Similarly, a New York 
Times article noted that in 2012 the Goldman Sachs' board met 12 times while directors were paid on average almost $480,000 (Craig, 2013). 
A related issue is the use of meeting fees to compensate directors. The 2013 Director Compensation Survey by the National Association of Corporate 
Directors reports that director pay is on the increase, as is the use of equity compensation. And yet, 57% of small-cap firms and 28% of the largest 200 
companies continue to pay meeting fees (Mullen, 2013). While such payments account for only a small proportion of director compensation, prior work 
suggests that meeting fees encourage director attendance (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). Thus, a relatively unexplored issue is the popularity of using 
meeting fees to compensate directors, and the extent to which meeting fees and other components of director compensation are associated with board 
activity, particularly monitoring and advising functions.3 
In this paper, I focus jointly on director compensation and activity to provide insights into how firms contract with their external directors. In particular, I 
examine how different components of director compensation interact with each other, and how they are associated with different types of director 
activity (monitoring and advising). Finally, consistent with prior work suggesting that specific contract features are determined by a firm's needs and 
circumstances, I provide further evidence as to how director compensation and activity vary as a function of firms' demands for director effort.4 
I find that firms appear to use meeting fees as a substitute for other types of incentive-based compensation, and that different aspects of compensation 
(level, equity-based compensation, and meeting fees) have different effects on board monitoring and advising activities. Specifically, I find that paying 
directors for attending board/committee meetings is associated with more-active boards and committees, and that more-active boards and committees 
are paid more. In contrast, at the committee level, a higher proportion of equity-based compensation is positively associated with monitoring activity 
but negatively associated with advising activity. 
Consistent with the findings of prior work (e.g., Adams, 2003, Linck et al., 2009, Linn and Park, 2005), I also find that the relationship between a firm and 
its board of directors generally reflects trade-offs between the costs and benefits of director effort. In particular, more complex firms and firms with 
greater information asymmetry pay their directors more. Further, firms with more growth opportunities pay their directors with a higher proportion of 
equity-based compensation. 
With respect to activity, I find that more complex firms have more-active boards and committees. I also find an inverse U-shaped association between 
information asymmetry and both the proportion of equity-based compensation and activity, consistent with predictions by Kumar and Sivaramkrishman 
(2008). Overall, these results suggest that when firms benefit more from director effort, they pay directors more, use more incentive pay, and their 
directors are more active. These findings are consistent with those in Fedaseyeua et al. (2014) that director compensation is determined by their 
qualifications, experience, and effort. The results are robust to different specifications that attempt to address potential endogeneity concerns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. Section 3 develops my hypotheses, and the data are described 
in Section 4. Section 5 presents my findings from empirical tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review 
A corporate board is responsible for monitoring and advising management. Different firms have different demands for monitoring and advising, 
depending on the costs and benefits of such services (e.g., Adams, 2003, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Gillan et al., 2011). These costs and benefits are 
determined by firm characteristics, suggesting that there is an association between such characteristics and aspects of the contract between the firm 
and its board. More importantly, different aspects of that contract, including director compensation and director activity, should influence one another 
because they are determined by the overall demand for director effort. Yet, most prior work has focused on either director compensation or director 
activity (but not both) as a function of firm characteristics rather than on the link between them. In this section, I briefly review the literature on 
corporate boards that studies director compensation and activity. 
2.1. Director compensation 
Although a large body of literature examines CEO compensation, the focus on director compensation is more recent. From a theoretical 
perspective, Kumar and Sivaramkrishman (2008) show that the relation between a director's incentive pay and his or her monitoring effort is conditional 
on the information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. Information asymmetry between managers and shareholders increases the 
demand for outside directors. With some cost, outside directors can learn what managers know, but outside directors cannot communicate that 
information directly to shareholders. Information asymmetry also increases the manager's bargaining power and the directors' dependence on the 
manager to acquire information.5 At some level of information asymmetry, the director becomes too dependent on the manager, and there is no 
marginal benefit of outside director monitoring; thus, the demand for outside directors decreases. Consequently, the association between information 
asymmetry and the demand for director effort is concave. 
Other work finds evidence of an association between firm characteristics and director compensation structures. For example, Yermack (2004) reports 
that director equity awards are positively associated with firms' investment opportunities and cash scarcity, but negatively associated with firms' tax-loss 
carry-forwards. Brick et al. (2006) find that total board compensation is positively associated with proxies for the need for monitoring and the difficulty 
of the directors' tasks. Furthermore, Linn and Park (2005) find that firms with more growth opportunities tend to have higher director compensation and 
use more incentive pay. Linck et al. (2009) also report that firm size is positively associated with total director pay and that research and development 
(R&D) expenditures are positively associated with the proportion of director pay in the form of stock options. Focusing on audit committees, Engel et al. 
(2010) show that audit committee compensation (total and cash retainer) is positively related to the firm's demand for monitoring (proxied by audit fees 
and the impact of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) regulations on the firm). In addition, Adams (2003) looks at compensation paid to directors who sit on 
different types of committees (monitoring, strategic, and stakeholder interests) and the meeting frequency of those committees. She documents that 
more diversified firms have a higher demand for director monitoring but the opposite holds for large firms and firms with more uncertainty. She also 
reports that growing firms devote more director effort to strategic issues, and that large, growing, and old firms have more director effort focused on 
the interests of the firms' other stakeholders. More recently, Fedaseyeua et al. (2014) report that directors who are board or committee chairs (which 
proxies for higher workload) or directors with better qualifications (such as directors with legal or consulting experience) are paid more. 
2.2. Director activity 
Director activity, or more generally effort, is inherently difficult to observe; thus, theory suggests that contracts should be based on observables 
presumed to be correlated with effort (e.g., Banker and Datar, 1989, Holmstrom, 1979). Menon and Williams (1994, p. 125) suggest that “there is some 
information conveyed by the frequency of meetings. … Several meetings would generally indicate a more serious effort to monitor management.” From 
this perspective, meeting frequency is arguably an observable proxy for board activity and board effort. For example, the E-Trade Financial Corp. board 
met 34 times in 2008 and 53 times in 2009, whereas in the other years between 2003 and 2011, the board met an average of 17 times. The firm's 2009 
proxy statement explained that during 2008 and 2009, the firm had undergone “two major re-capitalizations.” While anecdotal, this suggests that when 
a firm needs more effort from its directors, the directors will meet more often. In other words, director meeting frequency is associated with director 
effort. 
Other papers use meeting frequency as a proxy for director effort and find some evidence of an association between the number of meetings and firm 
characteristics. For instance, Vafeas (1999) finds that board meeting frequency is negatively associated with prior performance, consistent with the view 
that more effort is needed to turn firms with poor performance around, and further, that boards of poorly performing firms are under pressure to “be 
seen” as having done their jobs. Deli and Gillan (2000) document that large and highly levered firms have more independent and active audit 
committees, consistent with such firms having a higher demand for accounting certification to reduce contracting costs. In a more recent study, Brick 
and Chidambaran (2010) examine the determinants of board monitoring activity and find that boards (and audit committees) meet more often when 
they have a need for information, for example, during a merger or acquisition or earnings restatement. 
2.3. Director compensation and activity 
Director compensation and activity are two central aspects of the contract between the firm and its board members; thus, I would expect them to be 
determined simultaneously and to likely influence each other. For example, using data from 1992 to 2001, Brick et al. (2006) find that the number of 
board meetings is positively associated with directors' cash and total compensation. Further, Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that paying meeting fees 
increases board meeting attendance, even though the dollar amount per meeting appears relatively small. Together these results provide some 
evidence of the association between director compensation and director activity (or effort). 
3. Research questions 
I examine the association between director compensation and director activity. Theory suggests that when perfect monitoring is difficult or infeasible, 
the principals (the shareholders) should provide incentives for the agents (in this case, the directors) to exert the desired level of effort. The rationale is 
that higher effort is associated with improved performance and better outcomes (Holmstrom, 1979). Paying directors with stock or stock options 
increases the sensitivity of director compensation to performance and allows them to share income that results from their effort. In addition, theory 
suggests that the firm's contract with its directors should be based on observables presumed to be correlated with their effort (e.g., Banker and Datar, 
1989, Holmstrom, 1979). Meeting frequency and director attendance are arguably such observables. In this sense, paying directors for attending board 
or committee meetings can also be viewed as a form of incentive payment. In general, the more difficult it is for a firm to measure director effort and 
performance, or the more likely the directors will shirk, the larger the proportion of compensation the firm should pay as incentive compensation, and 
the more likely the firm is to use meeting fees as an incentive device. Therefore, I expect that firms paying more incentive-based compensation (either 
equity-based compensation or meeting fees) have more active boards, and that more active boards are compensated more. A potential mechanical 
association between board activity and board compensation is of concern if director compensation increases simply because firms pay meetings fees. 
That is, meeting fees increase both director activity and compensation. However, as I show later, because of the substitution of meeting fees for equity-
based compensation, firms paying meeting fees appear to pay lower total director compensation, and increases in activity indeed increase director 
compensation. 
Further, different firms will have different demands for monitoring and advising by their directors. The demand for monitoring and advising, in turn, 
affects the way that firms contract with their directors, including the use of different types of compensation (e.g. stock, stock options, and meeting fees). 
Thus, I provide further insights into board governance by determining whether different types of compensation are substitutes for, or complements to, 
each other and how they affect board activity. 
As suggested by prior work (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn, 1985, Gillan et al., 2011), a firm's demand for director effort is determined by firm characteristics 
that influence the costs and benefits of director effort. Thus, in studying the association between director compensation and activity, I control for such 
firm characteristics. This approach is generally consistent with the contracting literature (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992) and empirical evidence 
(e.g., Adams, 2003, Linck et al., 2008, Linck et al., 2009, Linn and Park, 2005, Smith and Watts, 1992, Yermack, 2004). Based on this prior work, I 
categorize firm characteristics that capture aspects of the firm's contracting environment into four groups: complexity, growth opportunities, potential 
agency costs, and information asymmetry. 
More complex firms, such as firms with disparate business segments and geographically dispersed operations, should benefit more from board effort 
(e.g., Adams, 2003, Boone et al., 2007, Coles et al., 2008, Fama and Jensen, 1983, Lehn et al., 2009, Linck et al., 2008). The increased demand for board 
effort might be due to greater potential agency problems associated with larger firms or more diversified operations, which in turn require more effort 
to monitor managers' performance. Further, firms expanding into new product lines or new geographical regions might need added input from board 
members with specific knowledge about the area of expansion. In addition, Smith and Watts (1992) argue that future growth opportunities are relatively 
more difficult to manage than assets in place; thus, the marginal benefit of director effort is higher at firms with more growth opportunities. The same 
argument applies for agency costs.6 All else equal, firms with higher (potential) agency costs will benefit more from director effort, especially monitoring 
effort (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). More importantly, while the costs of director monitoring (effort) increase with complexity and growth options, Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argue that the benefits of monitoring should outweigh the costs. That is, the demand for director effort increases with firm 
complexity, growth opportunities, and agency costs until the net benefit is zero. With regard to information asymmetry, following Kumar and 
Sivaramkrishman's (2008) predictions, I expect that the association between information asymmetry and the demand for director effort is concave. 
4. Data 
4.1. Data and variable definitions 
I identify firms in the S&P 1500 as of June 1 of each year from 2006 to 2009. This results in a base sample of approximately 1800 unique firms. For each 
firm, I collect three main groups of variables: director compensation, board activity, and firm characteristics. 
4.1.1. Director compensation variables 
Details on director compensation are collected from Execucomp. Data on meeting fees (including whether firms pay meeting fees and the amount paid 
per meeting) are not available from Execucomp and are collected from Morningstar. Morningstar does not report the aggregate dollar amount of 
meeting fees. Thus, I estimate the aggregate meeting fees as the sum of board and committee meeting fees, which I calculate as fees per board or 
committee meeting multiplied by the number of meetings held in the fiscal year multiplied by the total number of outside directors on the board or 
committees. Of note, actual director attendance is not available; thus, the estimated total meeting fees represent the maximum possible total meeting 
fees, assuming that all directors attend all board meetings and all committee members attend all committee meetings. 
My emphasis is on three measures of director compensation: (1) Aggregate Outside Director Compensation, the aggregate compensation paid to all 
outside directors each year; (2) % Equity-based Compensation, calculated as the aggregate value of stock and stock options divided by the total 
compensation paid to all outside directors; and (3) Meeting Fees, an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays board or committee meeting fees, 
and zero otherwise.7 Note that I focus primarily on aggregate board-level compensation rather than director-level compensation because the firm 
demands effort from the board as a whole. However, in robustness tests, I use director-level compensation and the results hold. In addition, I focus on 
whether firms pay meeting fees (rather than on how much they pay per meeting) for several reasons. First, almost 70% of the firms in the sample pay 
meeting fees; however, there is little variation in meeting fees across firms — most firms pay between $500 and $3000 per meeting. Second, although 
aggregate meeting fees account for a relatively small proportion of director total compensation, Adams and Ferreira (2008) show that directors at firms 
that pay meeting fees have fewer attendance problems than directors at other firms, suggesting that directors respond to these fees. Thus, it appears 
that paying or not paying meeting fees, rather than the magnitude of the payment itself, is what separates firms in the sample. 
4.1.2. Activity variables 
I use the number of board meetings as a proxy for board activity. However, I also use the aggregate number of board and committee meetings because 
boards often delegate tasks to committees. Board and committee meeting frequency are obtained from The Corporate Library (TCL), supplemented with 
hand collection from proxy statements where necessary.8 
Further, following prior literature (Adams, 2003, Adams and Ferreira, 2009, Hayes et al., 2004), I classify board committees into three categories based 
on their main functions. Monitoring Committees comprises committees whose main function is to monitor management, such as Audit, Compensation, 
Nominating, and Governance committees. Advising Committees includes committees whose main function is to provide advice to managers on key 
issues, such as Finance, Investment, and Strategy committees. Finally, Other Committees contains committees whose function does not fit cleanly into 
the main monitoring/advising classifications, such as Health, Environment, Safety, and Public Policy committees (see Appendix A for a complete list of 
committees in each category). I aggregate the meetings of all committees within each category to proxy for the activity of that category. Specific 
measures of board/committee activity that I examine include Board Meetings, Board and Committee Meetings, Monitoring Committee 
Meetings, Advising Committee Meetings, and Other Committee Meetings.9 
4.1.3. Firm characteristics and other variables 
I use several firm characteristics from the literature to proxy for the firm's contracting environment. These measures are collected or constructed using 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. In particular, Firm Size and Segments proxy for a firm's complexity (e.g., Linck 
et al., 2008). Market-to-Book and Investments capture a firm's growth opportunities (where Investments is measured by the sum of R&D Expenditures, 
the absolute value of Capital Expenditures, and the absolute value of Acquisition Expenditures, scaled by total assets). Note that I use the absolute value 
of capital expenditures and acquisition expenditures because I am interested in the magnitude of activity as opposed to whether it is an acquisition or a 
disposal of assets. Stock Return Volatility, which is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm's previous 12-month stock returns, is a proxy for 
information asymmetry (e.g., Linck et al., 2008). A firm's potential agency costs are captured by Free Cash Flow, calculated following Titman et al. (2004). 
I also control for other firm characteristics (Leverage and Stock Return), CEO power (Entrenchment Index, Duality, and CEO Ownership), board 
characteristics (Board Size, Board Independence, and Total Director Ownership), and external governance (Institutional Investors and Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index), all of which could affect the contracts between a firm and its board of directors. The final sample has 1384 unique firms, 16,749 firm-
year committees, and 4354 firm-year observations with complete data (see Appendix B for more details on the sample selection process and Appendix 
C for detailed definitions and a description of the construction of all variables). 
4.2. Sample description 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1A. Panels A and B report the summary statistics for director compensation and activity, respectively, and 
Panel C presents the summary statistics for firm characteristics and other variables. 
Table 1A. Summary statistics. 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for firms in the S&P 1500 from 2006 to 2009. The variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
Panel A. Director compensation 
    
Total Board Compensation ($000) 4354 1436.61 1196.85 1163.40 
 Cash 4354 543.52 469.25 340.38 
 Stock 4354 501.27 305.15 598.67 
 Stock Options 4354 275.88 23.39 531.14 
 Pension 4354 10.730 0.00 64.34 
 Non-equity Incentive 4354 11.50 0.00 395.44 
 Other 4354 94.16 0.00 435.60 
Director Total Compensation ($000) 4354 165.84 145.94 118.48 
Meeting Fees (0/1) 4354 0.67 1.00 0.47 
% Cash Compensation 4354 0.45 0.44 0.21 
% Equity-based Compensation 4354 0.50 0.51 0.22 
 % Stock Compensation 4354 0.31 0.33 0.24 
 % Option Compensation 4354 0.19 0.03 0.25 
Estimated Maximum % Meeting Fees 4354 0.13 0.10 0.15 
Panel B. Board and committee activity 
    
Number of Committees 4354 3.85 4.00 0.99 
Only Top 3 Committees (0/1) 4354 0.44 0.00 0.50 
Board Meetings 4354 8.35 7.00 4.05 
Monitoring Committee Meetings 4354 18.30 18.00 6.60 
Advising Committee Meetings 4354 2.68 0.00 4.72 
Other Committee Meetings 4354 0.82 0.00 2.12 
Board and Committee Meetings 4354 29.35 28.00 11.01 
Panel C. Firm/board/CEO characteristics 
    
Market Capitalization ($B) 4354 8.53 1.83 26.51 
Segments 4354 5.39 5.00 3.46 
Market-to-Book 4354 0.75 0.70 0.73 
Investments 4354 0.10 0.08 0.10 
Stock Return Volatility 4354 0.12 0.10 0.08 
Free Cash Flow 4354 0.69 1.00 0.46 
Leverage 4354 0.20 0.18 0.16 
Stock Return 4354 0.15 − 0.01 7.67 
Board Size 4354 9.47 9.00 2.38 
Board Independence 4354 0.76 0.78 0.12 
Total Director Ownership 4354 5.54 1.89 15.52 
CEO Tenure 4354 7.09 5.00 6.91 
CEO Ownership (%) 4354 0.02 0.00 0.06 
Duality 4354 0.55 1.00 0.50 
Entrenchment Index 4354 0.09 0.00 0.29 
Institutional Investors 4354 276.99 198.00 237.95 
HHI 4354 249.15 204.44 248.96 
 
Panel A shows that the average firm in the sample pays a total of $1.4 million per year to its outside directors (median $1.2 million), or approximately 
$166,000 per outside director (median $146,000).10, 11 General Electric Company's board is among the most highly paid, with $4–6 million in total 
compensation per year (about $360,000 per outside director). Among the lowest-paid boards is that of Heartland Express Inc., which was paid less than 
$50,000 per year (approximately $11,000 per outside director) during the 2006–2009 period. Director payments can take the form of cash, stock and 
stock options, pensions, non-equity incentives, and “other.” The most common form of payment is cash (used by 99.3% of the firms), followed by stock 
and stock options (used by 83.4% and 63.1% of the sample firms, respectively) (not tabled).12 In terms of the dollar amount, cash is also the single largest 
form of payment, averaging approximately 45% of total board compensation. Of the remainder, 31% is in the form of stock, 19% is in the form of stock 
options, while the remaining 5% includes pension, non-equity incentives, and other miscellaneous payments. Of the sample firms, 67% pay meeting fees, 
and I estimate that meeting fees account for 10–13% of total board compensation (assuming that directors attend all board meetings and all committee 
members attend all committee meetings). 
As shown in Panel B, the average firm has between three and four committees. In addition, more than 44% of the sample (56% of the unique firms) have 
only audit, compensation, and nominating/governance committees. On average, boards hold 8.35 meetings a year (with a standard deviation of four 
meetings). The most active board is that of E-Trade Financial Corporation (53 meetings in 2009 during its “major re-capitalization”), while the least active 
board is that of Supertex, Inc., which held only two meetings in 2008. On average, monitoring committees meet 18.30 times a year, whereas advising 
and other committees meet approximately three times and once per year, respectively. Conditional on being non-zero, advising committee meetings 
average 6.3 times per year (median five times), while the average other committee meets 4.5 times per year (median four times). In comparison, Adams 
(2003) reports an average of 3.3 committees among Fortune 500 firms in 1998. In addition, Adams and Ferreira (2008) report an average of 7.24 board 
meetings (minimum of one and maximum of 36) for S&P 1500 firms during 1996–2003, and Brick and Chidambaran (2010) report 7.26 board meetings 
on average (minimum of one and maximum of 49) during the 1999–2003 time period. 
The most active monitoring, advising, and other committees were those at Novatel Wireless, Inc. (77 meetings in 2008), Bank of the Ozarks (59 meetings 
in 2008), and Broadcom Corp. (27 meetings in 2008), respectively.13 Novatel Wireless, Inc. and Bank of the Ozarks pay meeting fees, but Broadcom Corp. 
does not. However, Broadcom Corp. paid more to its directors, both in aggregate and at the director-level, than Novatel Wireless, Inc. or Bank of the 
Ozarks.14 Overall, there is evidence that boards delegate tasks to committees, and that at the committee level, monitoring appears to be the most 
important function of the board — the number of monitoring committee meetings is twice the combined number of board, advising committee, and 
other committee meetings. 
Finally, Panel C shows that the average firm has a market value of approximately $8.5 billion, operates in 5.39 different business and geographic 
segments, and has a Market-to-Book ratio of 0.75 and Investments of 10%. Average Stock Return Volatility is 12%, while average Free Cash Flow is 0.7%. 
In addition, the average board has 9.47 members, of whom 76% are independent directors (based on TCL classifications) and owns a total of 5.54% of 
the firm. The average CEO has been with the firm for seven years (median five years), owns on average 2% of the firm, and is board chair 55% of the 
time. The Entrenchment Index which is the combination of the CEO's tenure of at least ten years and negative stock returns in the prior year (Salas, 
2010), averages 0.09. Given that 1 is entrenched and 0 is not, this suggests low average entrenchment. Finally, the sample firms have an average of 277 
institutional investors (median 198) and an average Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) of institutional ownership of approximately 250 (median 204) — a 
higher HHI indicates greater ownership concentration. 
Table 1B, Table 1C report the summary statistics for firms broken down into Large-Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap groups and across industry 
classifications based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, respectively. Table 1B indicates that large firms pay directors more and 
rely more on equity-based compensation, while smaller firms are more likely to pay meeting fees. In addition, large firms have more board and 
committee meetings. Across industries, except for the “Non-Classifiable Establishments” category, which includes only two firms, Mining firms pay their 
directors the most and have relatively active boards and committees. In comparison, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing firms pay their directors the least 
and, in general, rely less on incentive-based compensation and have less active boards and committees (Table 1C). 
Table 1B. Summary statistics by S&P classifications. 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for Large Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap firms from 2006 to 2009. The variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Variable Large-Cap 
(N = 1428) 
  Mid-Cap 
(N = 1180) 
  Small-Cap 
(N = 1734) 
  
 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
Panel A. Director compensation          
Total Board Compensation ($000) 2159.61 1914.22 1408.23 1350.05 1227.43 775.17 903.22 768.09 797.21 
Director Total Compensation ($000) 215.44 190.87 132.94 166.55 144.17 100.34 124.78 107.04 100.60 
% Cash Compensation 0.41 0.42 0.18 0.44 0.43 0.21 0.48 0.46 0.21 
% Equity-based Compensation 0.54 0.54 0.19 0.50 0.52 0.23 0.47 0.49 0.22 
Meeting fees (0/1) 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.72 1.00 0.45 0.70 1.00 0.46 
Panel B. Board and committee activity          
Board Meetings 8.75 8.00 4.01 8.13 7.00 3.95 8.14 7.00 4.09 
Monitoring Committee Meetings 20.08 19.00 6.19 18.04 17.00 6.53 16.96 16.00 6.51 
Advising Committee Meetings 3.91 2.00 4.97 2.38 0.00 4.27 1.90 0.00 4.63 
Other Committee Meetings 1.35 0.00 2.58 0.68 0.00 1.93 0.46 0.00 1.66 
Board and Committee Meetings 32.95 31.00 10.86 28.42 27.00 10.61 26.95 25.00 10.46 
 
Table 1C. Summary statistics by industry. 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for firms from 2006 to 2009 across industry classifications based on two-digit SIC codes. The variables are 
defined in Appendix C. 
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5. Empirical analyses 
In this section, I present the results from the multivariate tests. In each table, Model 1 incorporates key aspects of the contracting environment and 
Model 2 controls for variables shown in the previous literature to affect director compensation and activity (including CEO, board, and institutional 
ownership along with other firm characteristics). To control for reverse causality, all the explanatory variables are lagged one year (e.g., Jiraporn et al., 
2009). I also include industry and year fixed effects in all specifications, with industry identified using two-digit SIC codes. To facilitate the economic 
interpretation and to compare the effects, for each model specification (whether OLS, Probit, or Tobit) I report marginal effects for a one-standard-
deviation increase from the mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for the indicator variables. The results are robust across 
these different specifications; therefore, I focus the discussion on the findings from Model 2. 
5.1. Director compensation and activity 
I focus on several dimensions of director compensation: (i) total compensation (both aggregate-level and director-level), (ii) the proportion of equity-
based compensation, and (iii) the likelihood that a firm pays meeting fees. In terms of director activity, I examine overall board activity as a proxy for 
director effort. At the committee level, I focus on the key functions, including monitoring and advising. I examine the link between different components 
of director compensation and different types of director activity. 
Because compensation and activity are both determined by firm characteristics, examining the effect of compensation on activity, or vice versa, raises 
endogeneity concerns; in this case, these concerns come primarily from a potential simultaneity bias that occurs when compensation and activity are 
jointly determined in equilibrium. Thus, it can be argued either that compensation causes activity, or that activity causes compensation. To address this 
issue, I use 2SLS models. Further, to address a potential selection bias, I use two-stage treatment effect models. All explanatory variables are lagged one 
period. Finally, I include industry and year fixed effects in all analyses to address the endogeneity concerns arising from omitted variables bias. 
5.1.1. The effect of compensation on activity 
In this section, I first examine the effect of paying meeting fees on board and committee activity. Of concern is that firms paying meeting fees might be 
systematically different from those that do not. To address this concern, I use two-stage treatment effect models. In the first stage, I estimate probit 
regressions modeling the likelihood of paying meeting fees. I use an indicator variable that captures whether the median firm in the two-digit SIC 
industry paid meeting fees in the previous year as an instrumental variable.15 The rationale is that if the median firm in an industry pays for meetings, 
then paying meeting fees is likely a common practice in that industry, which in turn, should affect a particular firm's decision to pay meeting fees. 
However, whether or not the median firm pays for meetings should not directly affect that firm's director activity. The predicted likelihood of paying 
meeting fees from the first-stage regression is included in the second-stage regression, together with other variables, as before. The results from the 
second-stage regression are reported in Table 2. Panel A presents the results for board activity (measured by Board and Committee Meetings), while 
Panels B and C report the results for monitoring committee activity (using Monitoring Committee Meetings) and advising committee activity 
(using Advising Committee Meetings), respectively. 
Table 2. Meeting fees and activity. 
This table reports the results from the second stage of treatment effect models and OLS regression models with marginal effects for a one-standard-
deviation increase from the mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for indicator variables. The dependent variables are the 
natural logarithm of Board and Committee Meetings (Panel A), Monitoring Committee Meetings (Panel B), and Advising Committee Meetings (Panel C). 
The instrumental variable is the lagged industry median of whether or not a firm pays meeting fees. The variables are defined as follows: Board and 
Committee Meetings is the aggregate number of board and committee meetings; Monitoring Committee Meetings is the number of monitoring 
committee meetings where monitoring committees are those whose main function is to monitor management; Advising Committee Meetings is the 
number of advising committee meetings where advising committees are those whose main function is to provide advisory service to 
management; Meeting Fees is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays fees per board or committee meeting, and zero otherwise; Firm Size is 
the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization, Segments is the sum of business and geographic segments; Market-to-Book is the natural 
logarithm of the firm's market-to-book value of equity; Investments is the sum of R&D expenditures, the absolute value of capital expenditures, and the 
absolute value of mergers and acquisitions expenditures, scaled by total assets; Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm's one-year 
monthly stock return; Free Cash Flow is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm's free cash flow scaled by total assets is greater than 5% 
and zero otherwise; Entrenchment Index is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the current CEO has at least 10 years of tenure and the firm 
has negative stock returns, and zero otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the current CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and zero otherwise; CEO Ownership is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of equity owned by the current CEO is 
greater than 5% and zero otherwise; Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of 
equity; Stock Return is the cumulative one-year monthly stock return; Board Size is the total number of directors on the board; Board Independence is 
the proportion of independent directors on the board; Total Director Ownership is the percentage of equity owned by outside directors; Institutional 
Investors is the total number of institutional investors; and HHI is the sum squared percentage ownership of the top five institutional investors. All 
variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year, except for Stock Return Volatility and Stock Return, which are measured as of June of the current 
fiscal year. See Appendix C for more details. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable Panel A. Board 
activity 
 Panel B. 
Monitoring activity 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Meeting Fees 0.4180*** 0.3575*** 0.3522*** 0.3159*** 1.1821*** 1.1882***  
[0.0266] [0.0299] [0.0390] [0.0427] [0.0957] [0.0918] 
Firm Size 0.1529*** 0.0900*** 0.1317*** 0.1084*** 0.2551*** 0.2518***  
[0.0045] [0.0086] [0.0048] [0.0089] [0.0167] [0.0346] 
Ln(Number of Segments) 0.0192*** 0.0095* 0.0248*** 0.0143** 0.006 0.0131  
[0.0096] [0.0091] [0.0098] [0.0094] [0.0355] [0.0352] 
Investments 0.0083 0.0116** 0.0074 0.0075 − 0.0514** − 0.0203  
[0.0607] [0.0581] [0.0618] [0.0603] [0.2540] [0.2562] 
Market-to-Book − 0.0469*** − 0.0367*** − 0.0350*** − 0.0292*** − 0.0666*** − 0.0535**  
[0.0092] [0.0089] [0.0094] [0.0093] [0.0356] [0.0357] 
Stock Return Volatility 0.0812*** 0.0720*** 0.0874*** 0.0841*** 0.1262** 0.1269**  
[0.1542] [0.1512] [0.1600] [0.1594] [0.5959] [0.5968] 
Stock Return Volatility Squared − 0.0210* − 0.0205* − 0.0342*** − 0.0339*** − 0.0929* − 0.0718  
[0.2313] [0.2369] [0.2366] [0.2469] [1.0241] [1.0131] 
Free Cash Flow − 0.1203*** − 0.1054*** − 0.0525*** − 0.0506*** − 0.1635*** − 0.0001  






























































































































































Year fixed effects 4354 4354 4354 4354 1845 1845 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LR test of independent equations < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
 
As shown in Table 2, likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that the first stage selection model and the second stage regression model are 
independent, suggesting that applying the treatment effect models in these cases is appropriate. Consistent with my expectation, the coefficients 
on Meeting Fees are positive and significant in all specifications, suggesting that firms paying meeting fees have more board and committee meetings 
than other firms. Specifically, firms that pay meeting fees have an additional 10 aggregate board and committee meetings (or 36%), 6 more monitoring 
committee meetings (or 32%), and 3 more advising committee meetings (or 119%), respectively. These findings are consistent with expectations that 
boards and committees of firms that pay meeting fees are more active. 
With respect to firm characteristics that determine the costs and benefits of director effort, the results in Table 2 also suggest that boards at more 
complex firms (as measured by Firm Size or Segments) meet more often. In terms of economic significance, whereas boards and committees at firms 
with low complexity (measured as those in the 25th percentile based on size and the number of segments) meet 25.1 times, boards at more complex 
firms (in the 75th percentile based on size and the number of segments) meet 29.5 times, or 17.3% more (Panel A, Model 2). Similarly, monitoring 
committees at less complex firms meet 15.4 times, whereas monitoring committees at more complex firms meet 18.6 times, or 20.6% more (Panel B, 
Model 2). Further, advising committees at more complex firms meet 5 times, compared with 3.8 times for less complex firms, a 30.5% difference (Panel 
C, Model 2). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that more complex firms have a higher demand for board effort, both in terms of 
monitoring and advising, and as a result, boards and committees meet more often. Of note, while the differences are statistically significant, large in 
percentage terms, and generally consistent with my expectations, it is perhaps surprising that the absolute differential in meeting activity is relatively 
small across such levels of disparity in firm characteristics.16 This also suggests that there might be limits to the benefits of more frequent board 
meetings irrespective of firm complexity. 
Consistent with Kumar and Sivaramkrishman's (2008) prediction of a concave association between information asymmetry and the demand for board 
effort, the coefficient of Stock Return Volatility is positive and significant, whereas the coefficient of (Stock Return Volatility)2 is negative and significant 
in all specifications (except Model 2, Panel C). In Model 2, Panel A, counter to expectations, the coefficient on the proxy for potential agency costs, Free 
Cash Flow, is negative and significant in all specifications. However, I observe a positive coefficient on the interaction term Free Cash 
Flow ∗ Entrenchment Index, suggesting that for entrenched CEOs at firms with free cash flows (where agency problems are likely higher), director 
monitoring increases to offset CEO power. As a result, boards are more active. However, the coefficient on the interaction term is not significant in 
either Panel B or C, so the evidence here is mixed. Further, I find no evidence that growth opportunities are associated with increased committee 
activity, especially advising committee meetings (my prior is that firms with more growth opportunities would benefit more from director advising 
effort). Indeed, the coefficient on Market-to-Book is negative and significant in almost all specifications. This result is consistent with Deli and Gillan's 
(2000) finding of a negative association between market-to-book and the independence and activity of audit committees, but it is inconsistent with Brick 
and Chidambaran (2010) report of a positive association between Tobin's Q and the number of board meetings. The signs of the coefficients for other 
control variables are largely consistent with expectations. 
As a robustness test, I break down the sample firms into Large-Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap groups and re-estimate the effect of paying meeting fees on 
director activity for each group. The results (not tabled) are qualitatively similar, although there are too few observations to estimate the model for 
advising activity for the Mid-Cap and Small-Cap groups. As a further robustness check, I estimate the effect of paying meeting fees on director activity 
using OLS specifications that include the indicator variable Change in Paying Meeting Fees together with other variables used in earlier 
specifications. Change in Paying Meeting Fees takes a value of 1, 0, or − 1, which corresponds to firms that (1) start paying meeting fees, (2) do not 
change their meeting fee policy, or (3) stop paying meeting fees. The results (not tabled) indicate that while the coefficients for other variables are 
consistent with earlier findings, there is no significant association between Change in Paying Meeting Fees and director activity. Note that firms tend not 
to change their meeting fee policy very often. In this sample, only 265 out of 1384 firms switched their policy during the 2006–2009 period (49 firms 
started paying meeting fees, 174 firms stopped paying meeting fees, and 42 firms switched back and forth). Thus, out of 4354 firm-year observations, 
only 314 observations have a non-zero Change in Paying Meeting Fees. The insignificant association between Change in Paying Meeting Fees and 
director activity could be the result of a low powered test. 
Next, I estimate the effect of paying equity-based compensation on director activity. I use 2SLS with the two-digit SIC industry median proportion of 
equity-based compensation as an instrumental variable. Again, the rationale is that the proportion of equity-based compensation used by the median 
firm in an industry represents the standard practice in that industry, which in turn, should affect an individual firm's choice of how much equity-based 
compensation to pay its directors. However, the proportion of equity-based compensation by the median firm should not directly affect that firm's 
director activity. The results are reported in Table 3. Note Wu–Hausman tests (not tabled) fail to reject the hypothesis that % Equity-based 
Compensation is exogenous, suggesting that OLS models are more efficient for examining the effect of % Equity-based Compensation on board activity 
(as measured by Board and Committee Meetings). Therefore, in Panel A I report the results from OLS regressions of % Equity-based Compensation on 
board activity. Note that because of the requirement of equity-based compensation data available in the prior year for the first stage regression, the 
number of observations drops to 3276 in Panels A and B and 1404 in Panel C. 
Table 3. Equity-based compensation and activity. 
This table reports the results from the OLS regression models (Panel A) and the second stage of 2SLS regression models (Panels B and C) with marginal 
effects for a one-standard-deviation increase from the mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for indicator variables. The 
dependent variables are the natural logarithm of the Board and Committee Meetings (Panel A), Monitoring Committee Meetings (Panel B), and Advising 
Committee Meetings (Panel C). The instrumental variable is the lagged industry median of the proportion of equity-based compensation. The variables 
are defined as follows: Board and Committee Meetings is the aggregate number of board and committee meetings, Monitoring Committee Meetings is 
the number of monitoring committee meetings where monitoring committees are those whose main function is to monitor management, Advising 
Committee Meetings is the number of advising committee meetings where advising committees are those whose main function is to provide advisory 
service to management, % Equity-based Compensation is the proportion of total compensation paid in the form of stock or stock options for the whole 
board, Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization, Segments is the sum of business and geographic segments, Market-to-Book is 
the natural logarithm of the firm's market-to-book value of equity, Investments is the sum of R&D expenditures, the absolute value of capital 
expenditures, and the absolute value of mergers and acquisitions expenditures, scaled by total assets, Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the firm's one-year monthly stock return, Free Cash Flow is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's free cash flow scaled by total assets is 
greater than 5% and zero otherwise, Entrenchment Index is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO has at least 10 years of tenure 
and the firm has negative stock returns, and zero otherwise, Duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO is also the chairman 
of the board and zero otherwise, CEO Ownership is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the percentage of equity owned by the current CEO is 
greater than 5% and zero otherwise, Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity, Stock 
Return is the cumulative one-year monthly stock return, Board Size is the total number of directors on the board, Board Independence is the proportion 
of independent directors on the board, Total Director Ownership is the percentage of equity owned by outside directors, Institutional Investors is the 
total number of institutional investors, and HHI is the sum squared percentage ownership of the top five institutional investors. All variables are 
measured at the end of the fiscal year, except for Stock Return Volatility and Stock Return, which are measured as of June of the current fiscal year. 
See Appendix C for more details. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Variable Panel A. Board 
activity 
 Panel B. Monitoring 
activity 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
% Equity-based Compensation − 0.0029 0.0116* 0.0388 0.0677** − 0.5415*** − 0.4768***  
[0.0333] [0.0272] [0.1092] [0.1225] [0.5107] [0.5925] 
Firm Size 0.0612*** 0.0920*** 0.0974*** 0.0877*** 0.2423*** 0.2748***  
[0.0057] [0.0091] [0.0052] [0.0101] [0.0228] [0.0432] 
Ln(Number of Segments) 0.0242*** 0.0209*** 0.0180*** 0.0113* − 0.0611** − 0.0551**  
[0.0136] [0.0110] [0.0100] [0.0100] [0.0423] [0.0439] 
Investments 0.0400*** 0.0169** − 0.0037 − 0.0041 0.0451 0.0475  
[0.0836] [0.0677] [0.0783] [0.0759] [0.3675] [0.3536] 
Market-to-Book − 0.0551*** − 0.0577*** − 0.0446*** − 0.0435*** − 0.0302 − 0.0281  
[0.0115] [0.0096] [0.0099] [0.0099] [0.0401] [0.0396] 
Stock Return Volatility 0.0976*** 0.0747*** 0.0498*** 0.0529*** 0.1053* 0.1037* 
 
[0.2080] [0.1739] [0.1598] [0.1645] [0.6556] [0.6532] 
Stock Return Volatility Squared − 0.0239* − 0.0297** − 0.0158 − 0.0195 − 0.0623 − 0.0457  
[0.2735] [0.2404] [0.2237] [0.2384] [1.0541] [1.0294] 
Free Cash Flow − 0.0609*** − 0.0660*** − 0.0642*** − 0.0539*** − 0.1541*** − 0.0987  































































































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 3276 3276 3276 3276 1404 1404 
1st stage F-value 
  
236.863 169.488 83.5401 53.6169 
P-value from Wu–Hausman tests 
  
0.8362 0.0519 0 0.0002 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1361 0.2554 0.0854 0.1021 
  
 
I find that the coefficient on % Equity-based Compensation is positive and significant in Model 2 in both Panels A and B, consistent with the expectation 
that firms using more incentive-based pay have more active boards and monitoring committees. In contrast, the coefficient on % Equity-based 
Compensation is negative for advising activity in Panel C. A possible explanation is that when paid with equity-based compensation, outside directors 
rely on managers (who have the most relevant knowledge) to make key decisions, but then monitor more to ensure that managers are performing in a 
satisfactory manner (given the positive coefficient for monitoring activity in Panel B). In terms of the economic significance, a one-standard-deviation 
change in % Equity-based Compensation (22%, or more than $300,000) is associated with a 1% increase in the aggregate number of board and 
committee meetings, a 10% increase in monitoring committee meetings, and a 38% decrease in advising committee meetings (or less than one meeting 
in each case). The coefficients for other variables have the same sign and a similar magnitude to those in Table 2. 
As a robustness check, I estimate the effect of equity-based compensation on director activity for firms in Large-Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap groups. 
The results (not tabled) are qualitatively similar: A higher proportion of equity-based compensation is associated with higher board and monitoring 
activity but lower advising activity (although the association between equity-based compensation and board activity is not significant for the Large-Cap 
group). 
Of note, while both equity-based compensation and meeting fees appear to encourage monitoring activity, only meeting fees seem to motivate advising 
activity, suggesting different incentive mechanisms have different effects on different types of activities. Moreover, the results from Table 2 suggest that 
paying meeting fees seems to have a stronger effect in motivating activity than a one-standard-deviation change in equity-based compensation. This is 
something of a puzzle in that the average meeting fee is $1000 (or less than $29,000 total meeting fees per director per year because the average firm 
has eight board meetings and 21 committee meetings) while a one-standard deviation increase in equity-based pay equates to more than $36,000 per 
director. Yet, when roughly the same dollar amount of compensation is paid, there is significantly more director activity for meeting fees compared with 
equity-based pay. 
5.1.2. The effect of activity on compensation 
In this section, I examine the effect of activity on Total Board Compensation using 2SLS specifications to address simultaneity concerns. Similar to the 
earlier analyses, in this section I use the prior year's median industry board activity as the instrumental variable in the first-stage regression. The 
rationale for this indicator variable is that directors would not want to appear less diligent than directors of peer firms by having fewer meetings. At the 
same time, directors do not want to meet too often because meetings are costly for them. Thus, industry norms should affect director activity. However, 
the number of meetings that other boards hold should not affect director compensation at a particular firm (except through that firm's director activity). 
In the second-stage regressions, I include the predicted board activity from the first-stage regressions, along with other variables as before. I use two 
proxies for board activity, Board Meetings and Total Board and Committee Meetings. To conserve space, I report only the results from the second-stage 
regressions in Table 4. Again, the requirement that activity data be available in the prior year for the first stage regression decreases the number of 
observations to 4047. 
Table 4. Effects of activity on compensation. 
This table reports the results from the second stage of 2SLS regression models (Panel A) and the results from OLS regression models (Panels B and C). 
The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of Total Board Compensation (Panels A and B) and the natural logarithm of Total Director 
Compensation (Panel C). The instrumental variables in the first stage are the lagged industry median of the natural logarithm of Board Meetings and the 
lagged industry median of the natural logarithm of Board and Committee Meetings. The variables are defined as follows: Total Board Compensation is 
the total compensation paid to all outside directors on the board; Total Director Compensation is the average total compensation paid to an outside 
director on the board; Board Meetings is the number of board meetings; Board and Committee Meetings is the total number of both board and all 
committee meetings; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization; Segments is the sum of business and geographic 
segments; Market-to-Book is the natural logarithm of the firm's market-to-book value of equity; Investments is the sum of R&D expenditures, the 
absolute value of capital expenditures, and the absolute value of mergers and acquisitions expenditures, scaled by total assets; Stock Return Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the firm's one-year monthly stock return; Free Cash Flow is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's free cash 
flow scaled by total assets is greater than 5%, and zero otherwise; Entrenchment Index is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO 
has at least 10 years of tenure and the firm has negative stock returns, and zero otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the 
current CEO is also the chairman of the board and zero otherwise; CEO Ownership is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the percentage of 
equity owned by the current CEO is greater than 5%, and zero otherwise; Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt 
and the market value of equity; Stock Return is the cumulative one-year monthly stock return; Board Size is the total number of directors on the 
board; Board Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board; Total Director Ownership is the percentage of equity owned by 
outside directors; Institutional Investors is the total number of institutional investors; and HHI is the sum squared percentage ownership of the top five 
institutional investors. All variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year, except for Stock Return Volatility and Stock Return, which are measured as 
of June of the current fiscal year. See Appendix C for more details. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. 
2SLS 
   Panel B. 
OLS 





   













































































































































































































[0.4358] [0.4073] [0.4217] [0.4168] [0.4312] [0.4036] [0.4163] [0.3955] [0.3862] [0.3752] [0.3812
] 
[0.3699] 











































































































































































































































































































































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
4047 4047 4042 4042 4047 4047 4047 4047 4047 4047 4047 4047 
1st stage F-
value 
200.381 181.18 165.057 119.954 




0.1321 0.1013 0.0701 0.0005 
        
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.4119 0.4948 0.4471 0.4428 0.4213 0.5012 0.4608 0.5209 0.3121 0.3612 0.3297 0.3789 
 
Consistent with expectations, and with Brick et al.'s (2006) results for a sample from the 1992 to 2001 period, I find that increased board activity is 
associated with higher board compensation, although the evidence is weaker when board activity is measured by Board and Committee Meetings. For 
example, a one-standard-deviation increase in Ln(Board Meetings) is associated with 9% (or approximately $150,000) higher Total Board 
Compensation (Model 2, Panel A). This increase seems small but it is consistent with meeting fees being a small proportion of director total 
compensation. Note that Wu–Hausman tests fail to reject the hypothesis that Ln(Board Meetings) is exogenous, suggesting that OLS models are more 
efficient for examining the effect of board activity (as measured by Board Meetings) on Total Board Compensation. Therefore, as a robustness check, in 
Panel B, I report the results from OLS regressions. The results are qualitatively similar to those from the 2SLS regressions. As a further robustness check 
in Panel C, I report the results from OLS regressions with director-level compensation as the dependent variable. The results again are consistent — 
higher activity is associated with higher director compensation. For example, a one-standard-deviation increase in Ln(Board Meetings) is associated with 
6% (or approximately $10,000) higher Director Compensation (Model 2, Panel C). 
Focusing on firm characteristics that determine demand for director effort, I find that more complex firms (i.e., larger firms and firms with more 
segments) pay their directors more. From Model 2 in Panel A, a one-standard-deviation increase in Firm Size is associated with an increase of 45% 
in Total Board Compensation (or more than $675,000) or a 42% increase in individual director compensation (or approximately $70,000), whereas a one-
standard-deviation increase in Ln(Segments) (roughly two segments) is associated with an increase of just over 4% in Total Board Compensation and 
approximately 3% in individual director compensation. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that complexity increases the benefits of 
director effort, thus leading firms to demand more effort and pay their directors more. However, the results for growth opportunities are mixed. A one-
standard-deviation increase in Market-to-Book increases Total Board Compensation by 6% (or $86,000); in contrast, a one-standard-deviation increase 
in Investments is associated with a 4% decrease in Total Board Compensation (or about $60,000) (Model 2, Panel A). Nevertheless, the effect of Market-
to-Book dominates that of Investments. In particular, firms with more growth opportunities (those at the 75th percentile of Market-to-
Book and Investments) pay approximately 2% more than those with fewer growth opportunities (those at the 25th percentile of Market-to-
Book and Investments). 
With respect to information asymmetry, after controlling for potential non-linearity by adding (Stock Return Volatility)2, I find a positive and significant 
association between Stock Return Volatility and Total Board Compensation across all models. A one-standard-deviation increase in Stock Return 
Volatility is associated with an increase of almost 9–12% in Total Board Compensation (or about $120,000–$160,000). This finding is consistent with the 
hypothesis that increased information asymmetry increases the demand for board effort to overcome such problem. The coefficient on Free Cash Flow, 
a proxy for potential agency costs, is not significant. 
Overall, the results from Table 4 parallel the findings for director activity reported earlier in Table 2, and are consistent with the contention that 
directors are paid more when director effort is more beneficial. 
5.2. Additional dimensions of board compensation 
In Table 5, Table 6, I focus on several additional dimensions of director compensation. First, I study the determinants of the proportion of total 
compensation that is equity based and the likelihood that a firm pays meeting fees. Second, I examine the interaction between equity-based 
compensation and meeting fees on each other and on total compensation. 
Table 5. Equity-based compensation and meeting fees. 
This table reports the determinants of the proportion of equity-based compensation and whether firms pay meeting fees. Panel A reports the marginal 
effects for a one-standard-deviation increase from the mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for the indicator variables 
using Tobit regression models. The dependent variable is % Equity-based Compensation, the proportion of total compensation paid in the form of stock 
or stock options for the whole board. Panel B reports the marginal effects of a one-standard-deviation increase from the mean for the continuous 
variables and for a move from zero to one for the indicator variables using probit regression models. The dependent variable is Meeting Fees, an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays fees per board or committee meeting, and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are defined as 
follows: Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's market capitalization; Segments is the sum of business and geographic segments; Market-to-
Book is the natural logarithm of the firm's market-to-book value of equity; Investments is the sum of R&D expenditures, the absolute value of capital 
expenditures, and the absolute value of mergers and acquisitions expenditures, scaled by total assets; Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of 
the firm's one-year monthly stock return; Free Cash Flow is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's free cash flow scaled by total assets is 
greater than 5%, and zero otherwise; Entrenchment Index is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO has at least 10 years of tenure 
and the firm has negative stock returns, and zero otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO is also the chairman 
of the board, and zero otherwise; CEO Ownership is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the percentage of equity owned by the current CEO is 
greater than 5%, and zero otherwise; Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of 
equity; Stock Return is the cumulative one-year monthly stock return; Board Size is the total number of directors on the board; Board Independence is 
the proportion of independent directors on the board; Total Director Ownership is the percentage of equity owned by outside directors; Institutional 
Investors is the total number of institutional investors; and HHI is the sum squared percentage ownership of the top five institutional investors. All 
variables are measured at the end of the fiscal year, except for Stock Return Volatility and Stock Return, which are measured as of June of the current 
fiscal year. See Appendix C for more details. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Variable Panel A. % Equity-based Compensation  Panel B. Meeting Fees   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Firm Size 0.0386*** 0.0542*** − 0.0010*** − 0.0003***  
[0.000] [0.000] [< .0001] [0.2567] 
Ln(Segments) − 0.0109*** − 0.0107*** − 0.0004** − 0.0004***  
[0.001] [0.001] [0.0104] [0.0061] 
Investments 0.0167*** 0.0161*** − 0.0005*** − 0.0005***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0015] [0.0004] 
Market-to-Book 0.0221*** 0.0210*** − 0.0005*** − 0.0004***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0011] [0.0042] 
Stock Return Volatility 0.0214*** 0.0216*** − 0.0010*** − 0.0009***  
[0.002] [0.003] [0.0023] [0.0057] 
Stock Return Volatility Squared − 0.0145** − 0.0118* 0.0004 0.0003  
[0.016] [0.069] [0.1549] [0.2610] 
Free Cash Flow 0.0165** 0.0109 0.0002 0.0001  









































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Left-censored observations 183 183 4354 4354 
Right-censored observations 24 24 
  
Pseudo R-squared/adjusted R-squared 13.9432 15.6646 0.0940 0.1028 
Log likelihood 
  
− 2552 − 2531 
 
Table 6. Effect of different types of incentive payments. 
This table reports the effect of whether firms pay meeting fees on the proportion of equity-based compensation and director total compensation. Panel 
A of this table reports the marginal effects for a one-standard-deviation increase from the mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero 
to one for the indicator variables using Tobit regression models in which the dependent variable is % Equity-based Compensation. Panels B and C of this 
table report the results from OLS regression models with the logarithm of Total Board Compensation and the logarithm of Total Director 
Compensation as the dependent variables, respectively. The variables are defined as follows: % Equity-based Compensation is the proportion of total 
compensation paid in the form of stock or stock options for the whole board; Total Board Compensation is the total compensation paid to all outside 
directors on the board; Total Director Compensation is the average total compensation paid to an outside director on the board; Meeting Fees is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm pays fees per board or committee meeting, and zero otherwise; Firm Size is the natural logarithm of the firm's 
market capitalization; Segments is the sum of business and geographic segments; Market-to-Book is the natural logarithm of the firm's market-to-book 
value of equity; Investments is the sum of R&D expenditures, the absolute value of capital expenditures, and the absolute value of mergers and 
acquisitions expenditures, scaled by total assets; Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the firm's one-year monthly stock return; Free Cash 
Flow is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's free cash flow scaled by total assets is greater than 5%, and zero 
otherwise; Entrenchment Index is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO has at least 10 years of tenure and the firm has negative 
stock returns, and zero otherwise; Duality is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero 
otherwise; CEO Ownership is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the percentage of equity owned by the current CEO is greater than 5%, and 
zero otherwise; Leverage is calculated as long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity; Stock Return is the 
cumulative one-year monthly stock return; Board Size is the total number of directors on the board; Board Independence is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board; Total Director Ownership is the percentage of equity owned by outside directors; Institutional Investors is the total 
number of institutional investors; and HHI is the sum squared percentage ownership of the top five institutional investors. All variables are measured at 
the end of the fiscal year, except for Stock Return Volatility and Stock Return, which are measured as of June of the current fiscal year. See Appendix 
C for more details. Standard deviations are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Panel A. % Equity-
based Compensation 
 Panel B. Total Board 
Compensation 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Meeting Fees − 0.0416*** − 0.0403*** − 0.0243 − 0.0467*** − 0.0605*** − 0.0575***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0181] [0.0169] [0.0162] [0.0157] 
Firm Size 0.0358*** 0.0535*** 0.4894*** 0.4568*** 0.3204*** 0.4234***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0064] [0.0124] [0.0057] [0.0115] 
Ln(Number of Segments) − 0.0119*** − 0.0117*** 0.0561*** 0.0417*** 0.0395*** 0.0250***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0140] [0.0131] [0.0124] [0.0121] 
Investments 0.0156*** 0.0149*** 0.0371*** 0.0589*** 0.0797*** 0.0628***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0886] [0.0838] [0.0790] [0.0778] 
Market-to-Book 0.0209*** 0.0200*** − 0.0797*** − 0.0545*** − 0.0333*** − 0.0457***  
[0.000] [0.000] [0.0134] [0.0128] [0.0120] [0.0119] 
Stock Return Volatility 0.0191*** 0.0196*** 0.1063*** 0.1133*** 0.1268*** 0.1228***  
[0.007] [0.006] [0.2215] [0.2145] [0.1974] [0.1991] 
Stock Return Volatility Squared − 0.0136** − 0.0112* − 0.0146 − 0.0144 − 0.0476*** − 0.0333**  
[0.022] [0.084] [0.3360] [0.3399] [0.2995] [0.3153] 
Free Cash Flow 0.0174** 0.0115 − 0.0312 0.0534** 0.0848*** 0.0710***  


































































































































































Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 4354 4354 4354 4354 4354 4354 
Left-censored observations 183 183 
    
Right-censored observations 24 24 
    
Pseudo R-squared/adjusted R-
squared 
0.1480 0.1648 0.402 0.488 0.2893 0.3406 
 
5.2.1. Determinants of equity-based compensation and meeting fees 
In Table 5, Panel A, I model equity-based compensation as a percentage of total board compensation. I use two-sided Tobit regression models, because 
the proportion of equity-based compensation is truncated 0% and 100%. I again report marginal effects for a one-standard-deviation increase from the 
mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for the indicator variables. 
I find that large firms (Size) pay a greater proportion of director compensation in the form of stock and stock options. In contrast, Segments is negatively 
associated with the proportion of incentive pay. However, the effect of Size dominates that of Segments. In particular, more complex firms (those at the 
75th percentile of firm size and the number of segments) pay approximately 12% more in stock and stock options than less complex firms (those at the 
25th percentile of firm size and the number of segments). Thus, there is evidence, albeit weak, that more complex firms pay directors with more 
incentives. 
I also find that firms with more growth opportunities pay more equity-based compensation; the coefficients on Market-to-Book and Investments are 
positive and significant at the 1% level. From Model 2, one-standard-deviation increases in Market-to-Book and Investments are associated with 1.6% 
and 2.1% increases, respectively, in the proportion of equity-based compensation. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that future growth 
opportunities make it more difficult to measure director performance, and as a result, directors are more likely to be paid in stock and stock options to 
encourage effort. Furthermore, I find that Stock Return Volatility is positively and significantly associated with the proportion of equity-based 
compensation, while the coefficient on (Stock Return Volatility)2 is negative and significant.17 This again supports Kumar and Sivaramkrishman's 
(2008) prediction of a concave association between information asymmetry and the proportion of equity-based compensation. However, consistent with 
the earlier results, I find no significant association between Free Cash Flow and the proportion of equity-based compensation. 
The coefficients of the other control variables are generally as expected. For example, Leverage is associated with a lower proportion of equity-based 
compensation, consistent with the findings of prior work (e.g., Linck et al., 2009). Board Size is negatively associated with the proportion of equity-based 
compensation, whereas the opposite is true for Board Independence. Model 2 suggests that a one-standard-deviation increase in Board 
Independence (12%) is associated with a 1.6% increase in the proportion of incentive compensation. This finding suggests that director independence 
and director incentive pay are complements, counter to Kumar and Sivaramkrishman's (2008) prediction that director independence and director 
incentive pay are substitutes. Among the controls for CEO characteristics, only CEO Ownership is negatively and significantly associated with the 
proportion of equity-based compensation for the board, again suggesting that empowered CEOs, at the margin, might act to reduce director effort. In 
sum, Panel A provides evidence that is generally consistent with the hypothesis that when firms are expected to benefit from director effort and when it 
is more difficult to measure director performance, firms pay a higher proportion of incentive-based compensation.18 
In Panel B, I use probit regression models to study the likelihood that firms pay meeting fees. I report marginal effects for a one-standard-deviation 
increase from the mean for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for indicator variables. I find that complexity, growth 
opportunities, and information asymmetry are significantly negatively associated with the likelihood of paying meeting fees, although the economic 
significance is small (the marginal effects are almost zero). At first glance, these findings seem counter to the hypothesis that these firms benefit more 
from director effort and therefore should rely more on incentive-based compensation to encourage such effort. However, recall from Panel A that such 
firms pay their directors with a higher proportion of equity-based compensation. Thus, it might be the case that equity-based compensation and 
meeting fees are used as substitutes. 
5.2.2. How do different components of director compensation interact? 
To examine whether equity-based compensation and meeting fees are substitutes (or complements), I perform several additional tests. The results are 
reported in Table 6. 
Panel A reports the results from two-sided Tobit regressions in which the dependent variable is the proportion of equity-based pay. The explanatory 
variables include firm, board, CEO, and institutional ownership characteristics as before; however, in each model, I include the indicator 
variable Meeting Fees to capture whether a firm pays meeting fees. Again, I report marginal effects for a one-standard-deviation increase from the mean 
for the continuous variables and for a move from zero to one for the indicator variables. The negative coefficient on Meeting Fees indicates that firms 
paying meeting fees rely less on equity-based compensation — approximately 4% less than other firms (Panel A, Models 1 and 2). This finding suggests 
that meeting fees are a form of incentive compensation that substitutes for equity-based compensation. 
In Panels B and C, I examine the association between paying meeting fees and total compensation using OLS specifications, with the natural logarithm 
of Total Board Compensation and the natural logarithm of director-level compensation as the dependent variables, respectively. In addition to lower 
equity-based compensation, firms that pay meeting fees pay slightly lower total compensation (about 5% or $70,000 less for the board as a whole 
(Model 2, Panel B) and about 6% or $10,000 less at the direct level (Model 2, Panel C)) than other firms, qualitatively similar to Adams and Ferreira's 
(2008) results for a sample of firms during the 1996–2003 period. Also note that Firm Size is included in all specifications; therefore, the difference in 
total compensation is not likely due to a size effect. The results are robust to different size groups other than the effect of meeting fees on director-level 
compensation for the Large-Cap group, which becomes marginally insignificant. 
6. Conclusion 
Boards of directors play an important role in attenuating potential agency costs that arise from the separation of ownership and control. However, there 
is relatively little evidence about the contractual relationship between firms and their boards. Since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002, the 
director labor market has changed significantly. In addition, new disclosure requirements adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2006 
allowed me to create a new and unique data set of director compensation and activity to examine how firms contract with their boards. In particular, I 
study the link between director compensation and activity, two central aspects of the contract between firms and their directors. I also study the 
interactions among different aspects of director compensation (level, equity-based compensation, and meeting fees). 
I find that firms use different types of incentive payments, including stock, stock options, and meeting fees, to motivate director effort. Moreover, these 
different types of payment appear to be used as substitutes. Further, I find that different components of director compensation have different effects on 
board monitoring and advising activity. In particular, I find that paying directors for attending board/committee meetings is associated with more active 
boards and more active monitoring and advising committees. However, paying a higher proportion of equity-based compensation is positively 
associated with monitoring activity, but negatively associated with advising activity. In addition, more active boards and committees are paid more. I 
also find that, in general, the relationship between a firm and its board of directors reflects a trade-off between the costs and benefits of director effort, 
consistent with prior work. In particular, when firms benefit more from director effort (such as in complex firms), then they pay directors more and have 
more active boards and committees. Further, firms with more growth opportunities pay their directors with a higher proportion of equity-based 
compensation. Finally, I find an inverse U-shaped association between information asymmetry and the proportion of equity-based compensation and 
activity, consistent with predictions from Kumar and Sivaramkrishman (2008). 
This paper contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, it adds to the contracting literature. The relationship between a firm and its 
board of directors is a central component of the nexus of contracts that makes up the firm. Thus, understanding this contractual relationship allows us to 
have a better understanding of the firm itself. Second, this paper contributes to the literature on boards of directors. Taking advantage of the new 
disclosure requirements, I provide new evidence on the way in which directors are compensated and how different types of compensation are used. In 
addition, I examine the advising function of boards, an area of study that has received relatively less attention in the previous literature. More 
importantly, this paper simultaneously studies director compensation and activity, which provides a more thorough understanding of the nature of the 
contracts between firms and their boards. 
Appendix A. Committee classification 
1. Monitoring committees 2. Advising committees 3. Other committees 
Audit Finance and investment Health 
Compensation Organization Safety 
Nominating Merger and acquisition Environment 
Governance Strategy Public policy 
Stocks and options Operations Charitable 
Succession and management development Technology Ethics 
Independent directors Executive Pension and benefits 
Proxy Risk management Human resources 
 
Appendix B. Sample creation 
Cleaning step Description # of firm-year observations  
Starting sample: 1800 unique firms derived from Compustat S&P 1500 from 2006 to 2009 
 
1 No missing Board and Committee meeting data from TCL 5275 
2 No missing Board and CEO data from TCL 4864 
3 No missing meeting fees data from Morningstar 4690 
4 No missing Execucomp data 4687 
5 No missing Compustat data 4364 
6 No missing CRSP data 4354 
7 No missing Thomson Financial data 4354  
Final sample (1384 unique firms) 4354 
 
Appendix C. Variable definitions 
Variable Description 
Board Meetings The number of board meetings during the fiscal year 
Monitoring Committee Meetings The number of monitoring committee meetings during the fiscal year, where monitoring committees are those 
whose main function is to monitor management 
Advising Committee Meetings The number of advising committee meetings during the fiscal year, where advising committees are those whose 
main function is to provide advisory services to management 
Other Committee Meetings The number of other committee meetings during the fiscal year, where other committees are those whose main 
function is neither monitoring nor advising 
Board and Committee Meetings The total number of board and all committee meetings during the fiscal year 
Total Board Compensation Sum of total compensation paid to all outside directors on the board 
Total Director Compensation Average total compensation paid to an outside director on the board 
% Equity-based Compensation Proportion of total board compensation paid in the form of stock or stock options 
Meeting Fees (0/1) Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm pays fees for attending board or committee meetings, and 
zero otherwise 
Change in Paying Meeting Fees A variable that takes a value of 1, 0, or − 1, which corresponds to firms that (1) start paying meeting fees, (2) do 
not change their meeting fee policy, or (3) stop paying meeting fees 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of the firm's total market capital at the end of the fiscal year 
Segments Sum of the number of business and geographic segments at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat Segments file). 
If the number of business or geographic segments is missing, I assume that the firm has one business or 
geographic segment. 
Market-to-Book Logarithm of the firm's market-to-book value of equity. Both the market and the book value of equity are 
measured at the end of the fiscal year. 
Investments Sum of expenditures on R&D, the absolute values of capital expenditures, and the absolute values of acquisition 
expenditures, scaled by total assets measured at the end of the fiscal year 
Stock Return Volatility Standard deviation of the firm's one-year monthly stock return as of June of the current fiscal year 
Free Cash Flow Indicator variable that equals 1 if free cash flow is greater than 5%, and zero otherwise, where free cash flow is 
calculated as operating income before depreciation minus interest expense, minus income tax, minus dividends 
paid for common stock, minus dividends paid for preferred stock, and scaled by total assets (e.g., Titman et al., 
2004) 
Entrenchment Index Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the current CEO is entrenched and zero otherwise, where a CEO is 
entrenched if his or her tenure is at least 10 years and the firm has negative stock returns in the prior year 
Leverage Long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year 
Stock Return Cumulative one-year monthly stock return as of June of the current fiscal year 
Board Size Total number of directors on the board 
Board Independence Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Total Director Ownership Percentage of equity owned by outside directors at the end of the fiscal year 
Duality Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board, and zero otherwise 
CEO Ownership Indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the percentage of equity owned by the current CEO at the end of the 
fiscal year is greater than 5%, and zero otherwise 
Institutional Investors Total number of institutional investors 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index 
(HHI) 
Sum of squared percentage ownership of the five largest institutional investors 
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1For example, Jiraporn et al. (2009) and Ahn et al. (2010) study firms in which board members hold multiple outside directorships; Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) focus on director independence; and Klein (1998), Adams (2003), and Hayes et al. (2004) examine committee structure. 
2For example, Bryan et al. (2000), Brick et al. (2006), and Fedaseyeua et al. (2014) focus on director compensation, but not on board activity, 
whereas Brick and Chidambaran (2010) focus on board (and audit committee) activity, but not on director compensation. Adams 
(2003) examines director compensation and meeting frequency as proxies for director effort at the board and committee levels, but focuses on 
the determinants of director effort rather than on the link between director compensation and activity. 
3My paper is different from Adams and Ferreira's (2008) in that their paper focuses on how paying meeting fees affects directors' meeting attendance. 
4See Milgrom and Roberts (1992). Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver, 1993, Gaver and Gaver, 1995 provide consistent evidence with respect 
to managerial compensation. 
5Kumar and Sivaramkrishman (2008) argue that an outside director chooses to contract with the manager to maximize the director's welfare function, 
which is a weighted average of their utilities drawn directly from the firm value and their utilities drawn from the manager's utility. Being 
uninformed, the director will put more weight on the manager's utility, causing his or her effective independence to decrease. 
6In the context of my paper, agency costs are the potential loss of shareholder value as a result of delegating control rights to managers. Agency costs 
therefore might not be realized if directors can effectively monitor the managers. In other words, the higher the potential loss, the more 
beneficial the director effort becomes. 
7Since 2006, Execucomp has recorded the value of stock options as reported by each company. However, Coles et al. (2014) find a correlation of 90% 
between executive compensation reported by the company and executive compensation when the value of stock options is calculated using the 
Black–Scholes model. 
8Adams (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) use an alternative measure of activity based on board and committee size and the number of meetings. 
9Prior work suggests that the proportion of independent directors on boards or committees also proxies for director monitoring effort. As a robustness 
check, I use the product of the board (or committee) meeting frequency and the proportion of independent directors on the board (or 
committee) as an alternative proxy for director monitoring. Note that TCL reports committee membership only for audit, compensation, 
nomination, and governance committees; thus, measures of director independence are available for these committees. I focus on firms that 
have only these committees (more than half the number of unique firms and close to half of the firm-year observations). The results are 
generally robust to this alternative measure. 
10In 2006 dollars. 
11Linn and Park (2005) report that outside directors at 200 large companies were paid an average of $139,357 per year during the 1996–2001 
period; Adams and Ferreira (2008) report an average of $92,049 per outside director from 1996 to 2003 for S&P 1500 firms, while Linck et al. 
(2008) estimate that median director total compensation for S&P 1500 firms in 2005 was $112,723. Fedaseyeua et al. (2014) report that on 
average outside directors for S&P1500 firms are paid $178,000 per year during the 2006–2010 period. 
12In terms of equity-based compensation, almost 50% of the sample firms use both stock and stock options, 34% use only stock, 14% use only stock 
options, and less than 3% do not use stock or stock options. 
13Novatel Wireless' Audit Committee met 69 times in 2008 to review its “revenue cut-off procedures, internal control and accounting related to certain 
customer contracts.” The Loan committee of Bank of the Ozarks met 50, 51, and 48 times in 2006, 2007, and 2008, respectively, to “review and 
approve all loans and aggregate loan relationships in excess of $3 million.” Broadcom Corp.'s Special litigation committee, which was formed in 
2007, met 23 and 27 times in 2007 and 2008, respectively, “to evaluate the claims made in certain shareholder derivative actions.” 
14Broadcom Corp. paid between $2.7 million and $4 million (or $300K–$560K per director), whereas Bank of the Ozarks paid between $250K and $300K 
(or $20K–$30K per director) and Novatel Wireless, Inc. paid between $600K and $1 million (or $100K–$200K per director) during the sample 
period. 
15The fact that not every firm has advising committees might create another selection bias when examining advising committee activity. Therefore, when 
estimating the effect of Meeting Fees on advising committee activity, I also include in the first-stage estimation an indicator of whether the 
median firm has advising committees. 
16For example, in 2007, the board and committees of Time Warner Inc. (operating in eight business and geographic segments and with a market 
capitalization of around $60 billion) met 36 times, while the board and committees of Exxon Mobil Corp. (with 16 business and geographic 
segments and a market capitalization of more than $500 billion) met 45 times. 
17To address the concern of a mechanical association between director compensation (which includes the value of stock options) and the calculated 
stock return volatility (which proxies for information asymmetry), in a robustness test I exclude the value of stock options from the measure of 
equity-based compensation. The results are similar. 
18Note that I also conduct several robustness tests by focusing on Large-Cap, Mid-Cap, and Small-Cap groups. The results are qualitatively similar and the 
coefficients are more significant for the Large-Cap group than for the Small-Cap group. 
